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Dismantling the Soviet Security System. Soviet–Finnish
Negotiations on Ending Their Friendship Agreement, 1989–91
Suvi Kansikas
ABSTRACT
The Soviet Union had tied Finland to its security system through the
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA)
signed between the two in 1948. As the Soviet Union began to
disintegrate at the end of the 1980s, Finland exited the Soviet
sphere of influence – the region controlled through a system of
bilateral and multilateral agreements. This article analyses the
Soviet–Finnish negotiations to discard the FCMA treaty as a case
study of the changing Soviet European neighbourhood policy. It
gives important insights into the disintegration of the Soviet foreign
policy mechanism during the Gorbachev era as it elaborates on
both the intra-bureaucracy conflicts between the Kremlin and the
Soviet foreign ministry, MID, and later between the Soviet central
government and the Russian republic. As Finland was part of the
Soviet security system, analysing Finland’s exit from it sheds light
onto the crucial change that took place in the Soviet foreign policy
doctrine during the perestroika years. The Gorbachev leadership’s
decision not to defend its sphere of influence with force paved way
for the upheavals of 1989 which led to the Cold War’s end.
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Profound changes in the Soviet foreign policy doctrine after the ascendancy of Mikhail
Gorbachev as the Soviet communist party (CPSU) leader in 1985 paved way for ending
the Cold War. The Soviet decision to discard the use of force to keep its bloc together
diluted its power over its neighbours. The Warsaw Pact allies were quick to assess their
enlarged room to manoeuvre, and they began deep-seated transformations after the rev-
olutions of 1989. The process eventually led to the dissolution of the Soviet bloc and its
multilateral organisations, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and War-
saw Pact in the summer of 1991.1 Finland did not belong to the Soviet bloc, but as the
small neighbour of a superpower, it was part of Soviet security considerations. The Soviet
Union had tied Finland into its security system through the Treaty of Friendship, Coopera-
tion and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) signed between the two in 1948, thus gaining a guar-
antee that Finland would not switch to the other side of the Cold War bloc division.
This article analyses how Finland – in the context of the Soviet foreign policy change,
and the consecutive weakening of its power – was first able to gain more sovereignty vis-
a-vis the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1990, and then to negotiate itself out of the FCMA
treaty, and the Soviet sphere of influence, in the autumn of 1991. ‘Sphere of influence’ is
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not used here as a pejorative term, but rather as a concept that denotes the Soviet leader-
ship’s interest in attempting, if possible, to influence the policies of those neighbours that
it considered crucial for its security interests.2 In this article, the term refers particularly to
the region controlled through a system of bilateral and multilateral arrangements and
agreements that the Soviet Union established in the aftermath of the Second World
War – the Soviet–Finnish FCMA being the focal point here.
The collapse of the Soviet security system is studied by analysing this process through
the Finnish foreign policy leadership’s eyes. This article shows how the changes and later
the disorder in the Soviet Union and its foreign policy apparatus gave cause for the Finn-
ish leadership to re-interpret its leeway and to distance itself from the Soviet Union. This
process is captured in the Soviet–Finnish talks on the fate of the FCMA treaty during the
years 1989–91. As Finland was part of the Soviet security system, analysing Finland’s exit
from it sheds light onto the crucial change that took place in the Soviet foreign policy doc-
trine during the perestroika years. The Gorbachev leadership’s decision not to defend its
sphere of influence with force paved way for the upheavals of 1989, which led to the Cold
War’s end.
The FCMA was discarded in two phases: first, Finland unilaterally re-interpreted the two
international treaties that defined its post-war international position, the Paris Peace
Treaty and the FCMA, thereby regaining some of its sovereignty. This took place in
September 1990 – just one week after the signing of the Treaty on the Final Settlement
with Respect to Germany – and the improvement in the Soviet policy towards the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG) was an important motive for the Finnish move.3 As a wartime
German co-belligerent, Finland had been required to accept significant restrictions to its
sovereignty, such as limits to its arms acquisitions from Germany, as well as military coop-
eration with it. The re-interpretation of the treaties, Operation PAX, as it was later labelled,
was the first Finnish reaction to weakening Soviet control over Finland.
The second phase towards discarding the FCMA took place only after the August 1991
putsch, at a time when the Warsaw Pact had already been disbanded and its members
were negotiating the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed on their soil. The August coup
had been an effort by conservative forces to put a stop to the new union treaty promoted
by the Soviet government, which would have granted the republics some authority in the
field of foreign policy and trade.4 The putsch, and the change in the balance of power in
Moscow after it, changed Finland’s allegiances. Finland, sharing a 1300-km border with
the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR5), had followed closely the negotia-
tions over jurisdiction between the centre and the republics. For Finland, Gorbachev’s
Kremlin possessed an important source of influence even after the putsch: The Soviet gov-
ernment was the signatory to the FCMA, which required Finland to continue upholding
relations with it. However, in the context of Boris Yeltsin’s Russia contending for power in
Moscow, Finland, in September 1991, initiated negotiations to replace the FCMA treaty
altogether.
A new treaty between the Soviet Union and Finland was negotiated in October and
November 1991. In these talks, Finnish negotiators witnessed the disintegration of Soviet
foreign policy mechanism. The new Soviet–Finnish agreement was ready to be signed in
December 1991; however, there was no longer a Soviet government in Moscow to sign it.
To its discontent, Finland was stuck to the FCMA treaty even after the Soviet Union itself
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had collapsed. Its termination was left to be settled with the Russian Federation in January
1992, which Finland had recognised as the Soviet successor state on December 30, 1991.
An analysis on the negotiations to discard the FCMA gives important insights into the
disintegration of the Soviet foreign policy mechanism. The new Soviet foreign policy doc-
trine, which emphasised cooperation instead of conflict, no longer necessitated the kind
of security system built during the Stalin era. But as perestroika created more and more
turbulence, even within the Soviet Union itself, Gorbachev’s foreign policy line had come
under attack by the conservative forces. There were considerable frictions within the for-
eign policy apparatus on Soviet neighbourhood policy. Gorbachev was heavily criticised
for letting Eastern Europe go,6 and along the same line, the Finland specialists in the
CPSU central committee and the Soviet foreign ministry, MID, were – as this article shows –
also trying to undermine the new Soviet foreign policy doctrine.
The Kremlin did not at any time criticise Finland for amending the FCMA in 1990, nor
for the initiative to discard it altogether a year later. As it happened, Gorbachev was open
to talks on changing the contractual basis of its entire neighbourhood policy. In fact, dur-
ing his state visit to Helsinki in October 1989, Gorbachev indicated that the Soviet Union
would not continue the kind of political control over Finnish foreign policy decisions as it
had during the Cold War era.7 The Soviet Finland specialists, on the other hand, tried to
hold onto their foreign policy tools, such as the FCMA, even in the changed circumstances.
In the end, the Kremlin no longer had the need for the FCMA, whereas until late-1991 the
Soviet MID tried to guard the security aspect of the relationship, ultimately losing out to
the Russian MID.
This article fills a gap in the literature on the end of the Soviet sphere of influence. The
ability of the Soviet Union to influence Finnish politics has been recorded in previous liter-
ature, starting with contemporary political analyses8, and later archival-material based his-
toriography on Finnish–Soviet relations.9 Research on Soviet policy towards Finland is
scarce,10 and there is a particularly noteworthy gap in the literature on Gorbachev’s for-
eign policy goals vis-a-vis Finland. Gorbachev or his foreign policy aide do not talk about
the final episodes of the Finnish–Soviet special relationship in their memoirs and pub-
lished diaries,11 although several Finland specialists in the CPSU central committee and
the foreign ministry have published their accounts of the relationship.12 This shows that
the Kremlin leadership did not pay much attention to the bilateral relationship during
late-1980s.13 On the other hand, the MID representatives’ and other Finland specialists’
memoirs underscore that the lower levels of foreign policy mechanism had an interest in
preserving a say in Finnish affairs. This corresponds with the archival sources analysed for
this article. Recently, Finnish historiography has turned to analyse the last phase of the
Cold War as the archives for those crucial years have started to open,14 yet the focus has
remained primarily on the domestic policymaking level.
Research on Soviet policy in Eastern Europe during the final years of the socialist alli-
ance is equally not very extensive. Much of the literature focuses on negotiations over
German unification15, with little attention to Soviet–East European relations during the
years 1990–91. The works by Charles Gati, Jacques Levesque and Mark Kramer are the
important exceptions.16 The gap in the literature has been to some extent covered by
publications of Soviet and Eastern European archival sources.17 By contrast, the collapse
of the Soviet Union has generated a vast amount of research from many different angles.
There are several studies that bring light into the disintegration of the Soviet foreign
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policy mechanism in its final years. Also, the independence movements of Soviet republics
have been the focus of many studies.18
The materials analysed for this article are from two Finnish archives: The National
Archives, which houses the personal collection of former president of Finland Mauno
Koivisto (1982–94) and the Archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, in which
documents pertaining to, among other, the crucial years 1991–92 have been recently
declassified. The source base consists also of memoirs of several key participants, both
Russian and Finnish.19 Unfortunately, the documents on Soviet foreign policy making
found in published document collections do not give much insight into the bilateral
Soviet–Finnish relations.20 Where Soviet documents are inaccessible, the author has
referred to articles published in the CPSU party organ Pravda and the government paper
Izvestiya, which reveal the frictions between the Kremlin and the Soviet MID mentioned
earlier.
Finland in the Soviet security system
After the Second World War, the victors and the defeated set to negotiate a settlement for
post-war Europe, which was descending fast into a Cold War. The Paris Peace Treaty was
signed on 10 February 1947 between Finland and the Allied and Associated Powers, with
the United Kingdom (UK) and the USSR as the main signatories.21 The USSR received an
agreement on its new border with Finland. Finland was also required to accept all condi-
tions on any future settlement over Germany.22 The peace treaty was the multilateral set-
tlement on Germany and its co-belligerents, but the Soviet leadership needed bilateral
security guarantees as well. After 1947, it began to seal the gaps in its security system in
Eastern Europe. Its central aims concerning Finland were to safeguard its security interests
with a long-term agreement that would preserve a status quo in the bilateral relationship.
Proposals on similar treaties were sent simultaneously to the countries the Soviet leader-
ship considered its sphere of influence: Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. According
to Stalin’s foreign minister, Viacheslav Molotov, the treaty with Finland was to cover ‘the
northern flank of the Soviet security system’.23 Stalin had hopes for getting Finland to initi-
ate the treaty negotiations, but as this did not happen, on 22 February 1948, he sent the
Finnish leadership an official proposal for negotiations on a bilateral security agreement.24
The Soviet Union initially took the recently negotiated Soviet–Hungarian treaty as a
model for the Finnish–Soviet one. This proved unacceptable to the Finns. After brief nego-
tiations, which were assisted by a leak from the Finnish side indicating the maximum
demands Finland could accept, the FCMA was signed on 6 April 1948. It was a compro-
mise solution for both; the Soviet Union had begun with the idea of a military alliance,
which it discarded as it became clear that Finland would not agree.25 Significantly, a refer-
ence to Finland’s endeavour to stay neutral was added to the preamble of the treaty – it
was also the seed of contentions in the Soviet–Finnish relations throughout the Cold
War.26
The Soviet–Finnish treaty differed from the Soviet–East European ones in two signifi-
cant aspects; first, Finland was not obliged to give military assistance to the Soviet Union.
Second, if there was a perceived threat of an attack on Finland, or on the Soviet Union
through Finnish territory, military consultations would precede any Soviet military assis-
tance to Finland. The consultations were not automatic; both signatories needed to agree
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on their necessity and consent to their start. Military assistance, according to Soviet mili-
tary doctrine, would be given on Finnish territory; and consenting to the Red Army enter-
ing Finland was generally seen as a possible first step towards the annexation of Finland.
This is why the Finnish leadership’s main goal throughout the Cold War decades was to
reduce the possibilities for any need to consider bilateral military consultations.27
In Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union continued to tie the socialist regimes into a web of
bilateral and later also multilateral links. This included bilateral security treaties. It also
meant establishing the so-called embassy-system: Soviet advisers and military officials,
stationed in Soviet embassies in the region were tasked with forcing the regimes to follow
Moscow’s rules.28 During the first decade of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, the
socialist bloc had also cemented mutually-binding links on the multilateral level, as organ-
isations in the economic, military and political fields were established; the CMEA in 1949
and the Warsaw Pact in 1955. Although neither of the organisations provided the Soviet
leadership a total control of the alliance,29 and even though the USSR required also bilat-
eral security treaties with its allies, Soviet hegemony over its allies was at the beginning so
unquestioned that it has left the East European socialist countries with a label of Soviet
‘satellites’.
Finland was of course not a member of either one of these organisations, and was not
part of the Soviet alliance. Even with the FCMA treaty limiting its room to manoeuvre in
the Cold War conflict, its degree of sovereignty was significant when compared to the
Warsaw Pact members. Yet, being a neighbouring country, with a long common border, it
was a definite part of the Soviet security system, and had a significant place in the Soviet
neighbourhood policy. One foreign policy tool in this regard was the FCMA treaty, which
gave the Soviet leadership an assurance that Finland would not switch to the other side
of the Cold War bloc division, but would remain in a ‘grey zone’.30 ‘Finland achieved a
unique status somewhere between a military ally and a benevolent neutral, preserving its
independence and traditional system, but accepting important limitations on its foreign
policy,’ as the Russian scholar, Maxim Korobochkin, defined Finland’s Cold War era posi-
tion in 1995.31
The Soviet Union tied Finland to its sphere of influence with the FCMA treaty, and con-
comitantly one of the hot potatoes of the Cold War, Soviet policy towards the FRG.32 Arti-
cle One of the FCMA treaty set Finland to fight any ‘aggression from the side of Germany
or any of its allies’ on its own, or if so agreed, with the help of Soviet forces. Article Four
prohibited Finland from ‘establishing or joining any alliances that are targeted against the
other high party’.33 The fate of divided Germany, as well as fluctuations in Soviet policy
towards the FRG, had direct consequences for Finland’s position in Soviet foreign politics
because the FCMA treaty contained a clause in which Finland had accepted (West)
Germany as a threat.
During the Cold War, the Soviet leadership started using the FCMA treaty for political
purposes: it preferred the interpretation that Finland ought to consult the Soviet leader-
ship on its approaches towards western organisations if they were considered a threat to
Soviet security.34 Finland’s membership in NATO was out of the question, but gradually,
also organisations deemed ‘against Soviet interests’ were prohibited as well, and Finland’s
rapprochement with them required bilateral Finnish–Soviet political consultations. For
instance, during Finnish president Urho Kekkonen’s visit to Moscow in August 1972, when
the two leaderships discussed Finland’s free trade agreement with the European
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Community, the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev, referred to the FCMA treaty as a warning
when he asked Finland to postpone the signing of the agreement – which Finland in fact
ended up doing until the summer of 1973:
It [FCMA] has several important articles, one of which is that Finland follows a policy of neu-
trality. Is there a threat that certain forces in Finland could take advantage of the EEC agree-
ment and try to revise the agreement of 1948.35
1989: New thinking in Soviet foreign policy
After Brezhnev’s two short-lived successors, a young, energetic and reformist leader rose
to the top. Mikhail Gorbachev started with economic reforms, perestroika, soon after his
accession in 1985. Then he moved to Soviet international relations. He soon realised that
the triumph of perestroika was related to the successful ending of the bipolar confronta-
tion, and ending the Cold War became his central foreign policy goal. The Soviet Union
redesigned a new foreign policy doctrine, the New Thinking, which included an under-
standing that the direct use of force would erode Soviet legitimacy and bring an end to
perestroika. These ideas extended also into a revision of the relationships within the Soviet
bloc. In intra-bloc relations the culmination was the denouncement of the so-called Brezh-
nev Doctrine, which was created to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.36
One of the main surprises to observers of the Soviet foreign policy change was that the
Gorbachev leadership did not do anything to prevent the waning of its influence in East-
ern Europe during and after 1989. The People’s Democracies began their transformation
to a democratic, multiparty system and market economy mechanisms; and the Soviet
Union could, and would, do nothing but watch. One important reason is the crucial
change in Soviet foreign policy doctrine that forbade the use of force to keep the alliance
in control.37 The other reason was that internal developments in the USSR were taking an
increasing share of the Soviet leadership’s time and energy.
Soviet policy towards Finland was also in flux. In October 1989, just before the Berlin
Wall fell, but after the Polish and Hungarian roundtables had already begun the turmoil in
the Soviet bloc, the Soviet leader had time to make his first state visit to Finland. The main
outcome for Finland of Gorbachev’s visit was that the CPSU leader unequivocally
endorsed Finland’s neutrality. In the words of the final communique of the trip, Finland
was a ‘Nordic, neutral country’.38 Later, in his reply to reporters at a press conference, Gor-
bachev also underscored the fact that Finland was free to decide independently key for-
eign policy issues, such as its integration policy. In his words, ‘it is the right of that country
to deal with a certain organization as it sees fit.’39 This answer, as well as Gorbachev’s
entire statement, did not have an echo of the Brezhnev era references to the need to
check with Moscow first, nor between-the-lines threats of military consultations.
The declaration adopted by the Soviet Union and Finland during the visit, entitled ‘New
Thinking in Action’, referred to the FCMA treaty not as a core item defining the relation-
ship, but only after a reference to both the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final
Act. The countries were described to be ‘proceeding on decades-long experience of good
neighbourliness and interaction, gained during the validity of the 1948 Treaty on Friend-
ship, Co-Operation and Mutual Assistance’.40 Thus, the FCMA was still considered relevant:
for instance, in his speech the Finnish president Koivisto underlined that there was no
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need to change even a single word in the FCMA treaty; which was duly quoted by the
Soviet government newspaper Izvestiya.41 Seemingly, the new interpretation of the FCMA
positioned Finland exactly where it wanted to be.
The Soviet–Finnish declaration was in line with the New Thinking that the Soviet Union
was proclaiming, and it had relevance for the Soviet Union as well. On the day of the Gor-
bachev–Koivisto meeting, Pravda carried a headline asserting that the declaration
strengthened the foundations of the ‘Common European Home’42 – another one of Gor-
bachev’s foreign policy slogans.43 This side of the visit did not go unnoticed by the Finns
though: the head of political department at the foreign ministry, Jaakko Blomberg, real-
ised that Finland might have been used as a showcase for promoting a new view of the
Soviet Union.44 Neutrality had in fact been advertised to the Eastern Europeans by the
Soviet leadership, which had started to fear that its allies were interested in alignment
with West European institutions, NATO in particular. A policy of supporting ‘Finlandisation’
of Eastern Europe, argued a report prepared for the CPSU central committee in early-
1989, would help to propagate a ‘more benevolent image’ of the Soviet Union in the pub-
lic opinion around the world. Furthermore, this active engagement with the allies would
force the United States to ‘correct’ its foreign policy towards the region.45
For Finland, of course, the main point was that the Soviet leaders considered it a ‘neu-
tral Nordic country’. Gorbachev’s statements in Helsinki finally put the controversy
between the requirements posed to Finland in the FCMA treaty and Finland’s self-pro-
claimed policy of neutrality onto the backburner. As the Soviet leader himself stated, the
two were not controversial. Significantly also, the Soviet acknowledgement of Finland’s
neutrality reduced the Soviet ability to invoke the consultation and mutual assistance
mechanisms attached to the FCMA treaty.46
The Finnish leadership had for years yearned for the Soviet Union to accept and
acknowledge the country’s neutrality.47 Finally – as a result of the Soviet foreign policy
change – this was reached without any Soviet counter-demands. In October 1989, there-
fore, Finland finally had a more satisfactory position as a Soviet neighbour, as the FCMA
treaty’s value as a Soviet tool to control Finland was disappearing. Soon, however, Finnish
gains seemed outdated for the fast-evolving post-Cold War world. The countries in Eastern
Europe underwent regime change during 1989 and 1990. They initiated multiparty elec-
tions and an overhaul of central planning in economy. After the domestic changes were
introduced, they began to renegotiate their multilateral and bilateral ties to both the
Soviet Union and the two international organisations, the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact.
Realising that Moscow’s control over them was diluting, they seized the opportunity to
free themselves of both communist ideology and Soviet hegemony. During a short span
of time, many of the countries turned towards the EC and NATO. East Germany’s fate and
path of development was the clearest: in late-1989, the West German chancellor, Helmut
Kohl, proposed to begin a process that would eventually lead to the long-term goal of
German unification. In a few months, achieving this goal became very tangible, and by
February 1990, it became certain.48
Moscow’s relations with the FRG had improved to the point that a reference to German
aggression no longer seemed probable and no longer had any resonance in Soviet neigh-
bourhood politics. Also, Moscow’s neighbourhood policy underwent a drastic change, giv-
ing the former allies a choice of integrating towards the West. The Kremlin had given up
the best weapon of its Finland policy – the ability to control Finnish politics thought the
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threat of military consultations in accordance with the FCMA treaty. Finland’s position
became more relaxed, and it realised there was more leeway in its international affairs
than before.
1990: Finland’s first step out of the Soviet orbit
The unification of Germany became the focal point of the Cold War agenda after the fall of
the Berlin Wall in November 1989. The Soviet position changed gradually to accept Ger-
man unification, and consecutively, the former GDR’s entry into NATO structures. The 2+4
negotiations on German unification included the two Germanies and the four powers that
held rights over Germany as a result of the Second World War.49 In Finland, the German
unification process sparked a domestic debate during the spring of 1990. Many Finnish
observers began to understand that Germany most likely was going to regain its sover-
eignty in the process, and Finland was about to be left as the last country whose sover-
eignty was still restricted with agreements dating to the post-war settlement.50 At the
same time as the speculations over Germany’s future began, the Finnish leadership
reacted to that process with a foreign policy manoeuvre, which came to be known as
Operation PAX. It ended in September 1990 with Finland unilaterally reinterpreting one
part of the two agreements that restricted the country’s sovereignty: the reference of Ger-
many as a threat in the Paris Peace Treaty from 1947, and as a last-minute addition to
PAX, also in the FCMA Treaty of 1948.51
In its Soviet relations, Finland was playing with its cards close to the chest. As late as
early-September 1990, foreign minister Pertti Paasio stated that the unification of Ger-
many did not necessitate changes in the FCMA treaty. While considering the reference to
Germany outdated, he noted that it was obvious to everyone that Germany could not
become a threat.52 Also many officials and politicians were unwilling to re-evaluate the
treaty, for instance Finnish ambassador at Moscow Heikki Talvitie thought that in the pre-
carious international situation, Finland was better off with the current agreement than
without any agreement at all.53
The Finnish foreign policy-makers talked with their Soviet counterparts about the
advisability of continuing the FCMA treaty. The Finns were told by several Soviet high-
level representatives that the unification of Germany did not change the basic Soviet pol-
icy line, which was that there was no need to touch the FCMA treaty.54 On the official
level, both sides declared their support for its continuity. At the same time, a close circle
of key Finnish foreign ministry officials began to analyse Finland’s room to manoeuvre in
the situation.
In the spring of 1990, the Finnish foreign ministry conducted an analysis of the latest
developments in Soviet neighbourhood policy and the status of other similar treaties the
Soviet Union had with its neighbours. The embassies in East European capitals were asked
to report back to Helsinki about their residence countries’ bilateral treaties with the Soviet
Union.55 The replies revealed that the Soviet Union and its allies had renewed their friend-
ship treaties during the 1960s and 1970s, to update them to match the contemporary cir-
cumstances. The reference to the FRG as a possible aggressor had been removed from all
new treaties except the Soviet–Polish one. Significantly, the survey revealed that the
Soviet Union seemed even willing to renegotiate its network of bilateral agreements.56
This was consistent with the Soviet aim for the post-Cold War era to dismantle the military
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blocs and to create an all-European security system. With improving East–West relations,
the Soviet leadership did not see a need for the security system build in the Stalin-era.57
The decision on the timetable of Operation PAX was decided during summer 1990,
after the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl had received confirmation from Gorbachev to
the German unification: The Finnish government would convene on 21 September. The
foreign policy leaders, while preparing to reinterpret Chapter Three of the Paris Peace
Treaty as a unilateral act, rather than through multilateral negotiations,58 did not want to
put the USSR and the UK in a fait accompli situation. The foreign ministry’s chosen way of
conduct was to inform both the British and the Soviet governments a few days in advance
of the government’s meeting, on 17 September.59
Unbeknownst to his own foreign ministry, two weeks before, president Koivisto had
nevertheless already notified Gorbachev on Finland’s coming move concerning the peace
treaty. Koivisto had inherited a back-channel with the Kremlin from his predecessor Urho
Kekkonen; namely the KGB resident in Helsinki. He used the direct contact after finding
out that he would meet Gorbachev when the latter was coming to Helsinki for a summit
with US president George Bush. Koivisto’s message to Gorbachev via his back-channel at
the Soviet embassy Felix Karasov was that while Finland did not want to disturb the pro-
cess towards German unification and the Paris CSCE conference, Koivisto was willing to
discuss the Finnish decision with Gorbachev. The peace treaty, nonetheless, was never
taken up in Koivisto’s talks with Gorbachev; the two talked primarily about the Soviet
domestic situation.60 Gorbachev had bigger issues to consider, and did not have much
interest or time to devote to the particularities of Finnish–Soviet relations;61 Chernyaev
also did not think PAX was worth a mention in his political diary.62
The Finnish government meeting in which Operation PAX would be decided was
scheduled to take place on 21 September. The re-interpretation of the FCMA treaty was a
last-minute addition to PAX. It was only after the signing of the Treaty on the Final Settle-
ment with Respect to Germany on 12 September in Moscow that the Finnish foreign min-
istry leadership realised that if the FCMA treaty was left untouched, the manoeuvre would
be incomplete.63
On 19 September, the president consented to the inclusion of the FCMA into the
plan.64 This was communicated to the MID the next day. According to the reply ambassa-
dor Talvitie received from head of MID’s Second European department, Yuri Fokin, the
MID’s unauthorised stance was that the Finnish president naturally had the right to inter-
pret the FCMA if he so chose. The ambassador reported to Helsinki that the discussion
was held in ‘a very friendly atmosphere’ and that ‘Fokin seemed to understand our
conduct’.65
Since Gorbachev had not reacted negatively to Koivisto’s message – Gorbachev’s aide
Anatoly Chernayev in fact confirmed to Koivisto’s chief of staff, Jaakko Kalela that Gorba-
chev viewed the move positively66 – the Finnish president continued on the basis of his
assessment of the policy change in Moscow, which had been clarified during Gorbachev’s
state visit the previous year; the era of Soviet interference in Finnish foreign policy deci-
sions was over.
Thus, on 21 September 1990, the government of Finland decided that the references to
Germany in Chapter Three of the Paris Peace Treaty had lost their validity. At the same
time, the president gave a statement to the government meeting’s protocol that the refer-
ences made to Germany in the FCMA treaty were outdated.67
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The timing of Operation PAX was not trivial: the Finnish foreign ministry drafted the
first memorandum about policy alternatives at the same time as the 2+4 negotiations –
which aimed at the unification of Germany and ending the four-power control that posed
restrictions on its sovereignty – began. Once these negotiations would be accomplished,
Finland would be the only country in Europe whose sovereignty would still be limited
based on the post-war settlement. The Finnish decision in September 1990 to discard
these limitations was also timed with the German unification process: the operation was
executed just one week after the signing of the Moscow treaty.
At first, there were no protests from either the Soviet or the British side. The CPSU
paper Pravda even ran a non-critical piece on PAX, pointing to the fact that the FCMA had
been restricting Finland’s sovereignty, thereby suggesting that this was a welcome
move.68 The Finnish political leadership contemplated that they had been able to pull the
operation through successfully. The FCO showed its displeasure that the Soviets had
received the information earlier than they did, which was revealed in Soviet–British con-
sultations on the issue. Britain was nonetheless willing to let the issue drop.69
The Finland specialists in the Soviet foreign ministry, MID, had most likely been side-
lined in the process, and they interpreted this as a Finnish fait accompli, criticising Finland
for not checking with Moscow first.70 It seems nonetheless probable that the news of Gor-
bachev accepting the Finnish plan had been sent to the high-levels of the MID. When the
Finnish ambassador Talvitie, had gone to the MID headquarters to inform it about PAX, to
his surprise, deputy minister Yuli Kvitsinsky seemed to already know the reason for his
request to meet: Kvitsinsky had had a copy of the Paris Peace Treaty on his table.71 There-
fore, it seems likely that some officials in the MID did not know about Gorbachev’s posi-
tion and that those who knew, were displeased about the procedure anyways, and
wanted compensation for having been made to let go of its means of control over Finland.
Yet, MID representatives complained only about the new interpretation of the Paris
Peace Treaty. Two issues proved contentious: The Soviet foreign ministry was worried
about the strength of Finnish armed forces and the possibility of Finland retaining a
choice of acquiring nuclear weapons.72 On the other hand, none of the materials con-
sulted for this article provide any evidence that the Soviet officials would have considered
Finland’s reinterpretation of the reference to Germany in the FCMA treaty as a problem.
This was the conclusion of one of the PAX initiators in the Finnish foreign ministry, Rene
Nyberg as well73 – and it was a view echoed in the memoirs of the MID officials.74
There is, in fact, plenty of evidence to support the argument that the Soviet Union did
not have a problem with Finland giving the FCMA a new interpretation. Soviet diplomats
were irritated by the way the operation was executed, not so much about its contents.
This was even admitted by the Soviet diplomat Vadim Andreev at the end of October:
’The problem lies not with the solution – of which there is no difference of opinion – but
with the way it was accomplished, bypassing the Soviet Union.’75
It seemed that there were contradictions within the Moscow foreign policy-makers on
the policy towards Finland. As Soviet president, Mikhail Gorbachev no longer saw the
need to restrict Finland’s policies, and as much was also publicly stated. The MID, on the
other hand, still considered that it had, or that at least it should have, some say in how Fin-
land approached its foreign relations. The MID’s Finland specialists apparently continued
to uphold the line that the role that the FCMA treaty had had in monitoring Finnish affairs
should not be squandered. In several consecutive meetings with Finnish diplomats in
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Moscow and in Helsinki, they let their disapproval be known. The government paper Izves-
tiya also criticised Finland for the unilateral move, referring to statements from Gorba-
chev’s visit the year before when the Finnish president had underscored that there was
no need to change even one word of the treaty.76 The MID was more invested in the
Finnish–Soviet relationship, and it had more interest to safeguard the special status of Fin-
land in Soviet foreign policy. For instance, in late-September 1990, Vadim Andreev from
the Soviet embassy in Helsinki met head of political department Blomberg to criticise Fin-
land for its actions. During the meeting, he was nevertheless forced to admit that he was
acting on his own initiative without any instructions from the Kremlin.77
The MID refused to give up, and the Finnish ambassador at Moscow was told that the
Soviet Union needed more guarantees that Finland’s foreign policy line, and particularly
its armaments policy, would not change. The MID remained adamant even after several
Finnish attempts to soothe the Soviet concerns. In early-November, the MID even sent
Finland an official note asking the government to give the Soviet Union the required secu-
rity guarantees. Ultimately, foreign ministers Eduard Shevardnadze and Pertti Paasio
decided that after Finland replies to the note, the issue is settled.78
Later, Karasov from the Soviet embassy admitted that the MID probably never asked for
Gorbachev’s opinion in sending the note but considered this to fall within its own jurisdic-
tion. He also confirmed that he considered the issue so minor that there had been no
need to take it to the highest level.79 As was considered by Blomberg already at the time,
much of the MID’s actions had to do with their endeavour to strengthen their positions in
the changing power constellation that the perestroika had brought into Soviet politics.
This final episode also had to do with Soviet security concerns, and particularly, the
strength of Finnish defence in the future, and not the FCMA treaty.80
To put Operation PAX into an international perspective, it needs to be analysed in the
context of the changing Soviet neighbourhood policy. As stated above, the unification of
Germany, according to Finnish analyses, would have left Finland as the only European
country whose sovereignty was limited by settlements from the 1940s. This was the main
motivation for the reinterpretation of the FCMA and the Paris Peace Treaty. The Finnish
foreign ministry also noted that Finland was already the only defeated country that was
still abiding to the peace treaty restrictions on its armaments and armed forces. Italy, Hun-
gary and Romania had joined military pacts, which made the Paris settlement redundant;
and Japan had unilaterally withdrawn from those limitations.81
The press release of Operation PAX given by the Finnish leadership referred to changes
in the Soviet alliance policy. The foreign ministry itself also analysed the status of other
friendship treaties the Soviet Union had signed with its neighbours. Not surprisingly, Aus-
tria, as well as all members of the Soviet alliance were also reconsidering their arrange-
ments with Moscow.82
Simultaneously, the Soviet alliance was losing its legitimacy, raison d’être as well as its
members. The first country to initiate talks on the bilateral friendship agreement with the
Soviet Union was Czechoslovakia, whose newly-elected president Vaclav Havel took the
issue up in negotiations with Gorbachev in January 1990. By the summer of 1990, none-
theless, the Czechoslovak government had not initiated either the old one’s termination,
or even its discontinuation after it would expire. Hungary had been able to agree with
Moscow to redraw a new pact. In his talks with Gorbachev, prime minister Jozsef Antall
had also expressed his hope to start a discussion about the future of the Warsaw Pact
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with other member states. Romania and Soviet Union had recently set up a working group
to update the bilateral agreements,83 while Bulgaria was not interested to take up the
issue.84 The German Democratic Republic (GDR) was under the impression that its agree-
ment with the Soviet Union would not impede its progression towards the unification
with West Germany.85 Out of the Eastern Europeans, only Poland, under the rule of Woj-
ciech Jaruzelski seemed to be taking a different position; due to security considerations,
the German unification pushed it closer to the Soviet Union. Jaruzelski visited Moscow in
April 1990, and underscored his country’s hesitancy to change the friendship, or any other
pact, which guaranteed its borders.86 Yet, Poland had already started to negotiate the
withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed on its soil.87
For the most part, the Finns were also content with the FCMA treaty. At the end of
1990, the majority of the foreign policy leadership considered that there was no need to
get rid of the treaty. Operation PAX had been a swift move that was in stark contrast with
the caution with which Finnish Eastern policy had been conducted for decades. However,
in the context of the East Europeans’ rapid departure from the Soviet bloc, Finland could
weigh its options with less haste. For instance, by the end of 1990, Hungary had already
begun to negotiate an association agreement, the so-called Europe Agreement, with the
EC. The agreement contained a clear indication of its ambition to ultimately join the Com-
munity, granted its economic restructuring was advanced to an appropriate state.88 More-
over, the Hungarian foreign minister Guyla Horn had as early as February 1990 – on an
academic note, and not as a state representative – contemplated on some kind of integra-
tion into NATO.89
1991: Transition from Soviet to Russian power
As the Finnish foreign policy leadership was soon to notice, Moscow’s power continued to
dilute and its ability to remain the centre was next challenged by its constituent parts –
several of the socialist federative republics started their quest for independence and sov-
ereignty. The Baltic States’ declarations and pursuit of independence were a small foreign
policy predicament for Finland,90 but Russia, as the most important of the Soviet republics,
and Finland’s neighbour, posed a diplomatic dilemma for Finland. Finland needed to
make a choice between the old and the new leaders in Moscow. As long as there was
uncertainty as to which of the two would grab power, Finland could not change its alle-
giances. Also, Finland’s president Koivisto was on a personal level connected to Gorba-
chev, and supported him staying in power.
Dealing with the repercussions of Operation PAX, the Finnish leadership had observed
the problems within Soviet foreign policy mechanism: The Kremlin and the MID seemed
to be fighting over the foreign policy line. Finland had tried to fit its own foreign policy
into this constellation, but it was not easy, as developments in Moscow escalated further.
During the year 1991, which became the final one for the Soviet regime, the Finnish lead-
ership watched as Soviet power and its foreign policy mechanism disintegrated: Gorba-
chev was losing his power and support base, and the national republics began their
march to independence.
The year 1991 began with disturbing news on clashes between the Soviet central gov-
ernment and the national republics, particularly in the Caucasus and in the Baltics. The vio-
lent suppression of the independence movement in Vilnius in 11–13 January 1991 was in
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fact the final straw for the Soviet military alliance: on 15 January, the leaders of three War-
saw Pact countries, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary met in Visegrad to discuss their
trilateral cooperation in the event of more sinister news from the Soviet Union. The three
countries had been promoting changing the Warsaw Pact into a political organisation and
dissolving its military structures. However, after the Soviet interference in Lithuania, they
turned towards withdrawing completely from the organisation’s activities by June and
called for a meeting to disband the organisation.91
Gorbachev’s attempt to maintain Soviet power and his own government’s legitimacy
was the introduction of a new union treaty, which would have granted the republics
some jurisdiction over their national affairs. During the summer of 1991, Gorbachev was
backed by Russia’s newly elected president Boris Yeltsin, although the latter was also seen
pushing more for room to manoeuvre for Russia.
President Koivisto travelled to Moscow to meet Gorbachev in June 1991. During his
visit, he also held discussions with the president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, who wanted to
use the opening of relations with foreign representatives to gain international authority
for himself.92 Yeltsin urged that the two governments start negotiations on arranging their
relations. He grounded his proposal on the upcoming new federal treaty that Gorbachev
was striving to achieve: According to him, in the new situation, Russia would gain jurisdic-
tion over foreign affairs and foreign trade, and with Finland bordering Russia, and its east-
ern trade mainly conducted with Russia, it would need start dealing with Yeltsin’s
government on issues of trade and foreign policy. Yeltsin was invited to send a delegation
to Finland in the autumn, to start negotiations on the basis of the new relationship. Koi-
visto would not consent to any further action, also not giving any support to Russia
against the Soviet central government.93
Initially the Finns had held their distance to Yeltsin, but the failed putsch in August
changed the situation. The Finnish government’s first conclusion in the new situation
was to recognise the three Baltic States,94 a move that Yeltsin had already done in his
effort to downplay Gorbachev.95 A meeting of the foreign ministry leadership in Helsinki
on 2 September outlined the next few steps: with the FCMA treaty, the foreign ministry
leadership decided to wait. There was no knowing what the result of the upheaval would
be, so there was no point in acting yet. Contacts with Russia, on the other hand, would
be begun immediately: according to the memorandum of the meeting, ‘we should not
wait to see how the relations between Russia and the former (sic) Soviet Union will
develop’.96
In early September 1991, nonetheless, Koivisto came to consider that the FCMA treaty
needed to be replaced with a new one, more fitting to the contemporary situation. In his
view, the new agreement should be like the one between the Soviet Union and the FRG
signed in September 1990. He made his decision without consulting the Finnish foreign
ministry; yet discussed the issue with prime minister Esko Aho.97 A message carrying this
position was sent through KGB’s Karasov to Gorbachev on 12 September.98
From there, the situation developed fast. Soviet foreign minister Boris Pankin, in a
speech in Stockholm on 18 September, stated that the Soviet Union was ready to discuss
the FCMA treaty with Finland. It seems very possible that Koivisto’s message reached Gor-
bachev, who then had formulated the new Soviet stance to Pankin. Yet, Koivisto’s chief of
staff Jaakko Kalela doubted already at the time whether the information channels in Mos-
cow were working so efficiently that in a few days Koivisto’s message would have
THE INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW 95
travelled from Karasov to Chernyaev to Gorbachev, and after his decision, back to Cher-
nayev and then Pankin, who then would also have had time to change his speech to
include the passage on the FCMA.99 What is certain is that the information on Koivisto’s
overture did not reach the Finnish foreign ministry, so its officials were left wondering
whether Pankin had in fact spoken more than had been decided in the Kremlin.100
The Soviet ambassador at Helsinki, Boris Aristov, most likely unaware that Gorbachev
had given his consent to his foreign minister, was quite opposed to starting negotiations
to annul the FCMA. Meeting with the Finnish foreign minister Paavo V€ayrynen after
Pankin’s press conference, Aristov explained that the Soviet Union was not ready to start
discussing the FCMA treaty. V€ayrynen referred to the same reasoning that Yeltsin had
used: after Gorbachev’s new federal agreement, the republics would gain some authority
in foreign affairs and therefore Finland needed to start negotiating with Russia. For this
reason, also the Finnish agreement with the federal government had to be re-evalu-
ated.101 It is not clear from the available sources whether V€ayrynen knew that Pankin had
already been informed by Gorbachev that Finland wanted to open negotiations on a new
treaty. It is also likely that Aristov had not received an update, and was acting on the line
pursued by the MID.
This would concur with the knowledge we have of how bad the information flow was
in the autumn months between Gorbachev and his foreign ministry. According to one of
the PAX initiators, the communication between the Kremlin and the MID was ‘careless
and uncontrolled’.102 Also, this account matches with the memoirs of Finland experts in
the MID as well as the CPSU central committee that point to a continued interest on their
part to continue monitoring Finland.103
On 22 September 1991, during a meeting with his Soviet counterpart Pankin, foreign
minister V€ayrynen voiced the Finnish wish to discard the FCMA treaty altogether. They
needed an entirely new agreement.104 Pankin concurred that the Soviet Union was ready
to start discussions: it had been content with the agreement and the role it had played,
but now it would be fitting to draft a new basis for the mutual relationship between the
two countries. ‘The FCMA and the first two articles are in many ways outdated’, said Pan-
kin, referring to the articles on Germany. President Koivisto’s position was that the new
agreement should be like those that the Soviet Union had recently signed with Germany
and others. Pankin again concurred, and referred to the agreement signed with France. In
the end, the foreign ministers agreed that the negotiations would start during head of
political department, Jaakko Blomberg’s forthcoming visit to Moscow.105
Finland and the Soviet Union had two rounds of negotiations on a new agreement,
which came to be called ‘Agreement on Good-neighbourly Relations and Cooperation’.
The Finns had also stated their willingness to open negotiations with Russia. Those nego-
tiations were set to begin in late-November, as the three planned agreements – a general
agreement, trade agreement and an agreement on cooperation in the border area – were
contingent on the agreement between Finland and the Soviet Union.106
The first round of Soviet–Finnish negotiations to replace the FCMA took place in Octo-
ber. One major issue that the Soviet side had was the question of borders. Finland reclaim-
ing Karelia, which it lost in the Paris Peace Treaty, was dreaded in the Soviet Union, and its
fears were aggravated by a public discussion which broke out in Finland in the autumn.
Finland would have wanted to add only a reference to the Helsinki Final Act, which left
open the possibility of ‘a peaceful change of borders’, whereas the Soviet negotiators
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demanded a clause in which Finland would relinquish all territorial claims. This clause had
been included in the agreements with Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Germany already.107
The negotiations were continued in early-November. Here again the Soviet negotiators,
led by Yuri Deryabin, put up a tough fight. They were insistent that the Soviet Union
receive security guarantees from Finland. Even though the Soviet side pushed hard in the
negotiations, the border issue was settled as a compromise. Also, it was settled that the
FCMA treaty would be annulled once the new agreement was signed; the agreed date for
that was 18 December.108
The Finnish concerns, rather, were how the negotiations would be finished. If the year
before the Finns had observed a rivalry between the Soviet president and the MID, now
the power struggle was between the centre and the republics. This corresponds to other
accounts on the final phases of the Soviet regime. One of Gorbachev’s aides, Andrei Gra-
chev, in his memoirs elaborates the way in which the Soviet foreign policy making fell
apart due to intra-office rivalries.109 For instance, in November, the Finnish foreign minis-
try received news that Yeltsin had decided that Russia would soon stop paying for its
share of the Soviet MID expenses.110 Would Finland have time to finish the negotiations
that would replace the notorious FCMA treaty before Soviet authority collapsed?
The Finnish–Soviet negotiations continued throughout the autumn of 1991, although
news of the Kremlin’s weakening position were more frequent. Negotiations with the
Soviet government ended in early November, and the agreement to replace the FCMA
treaty was initialled on December 9. The agreed date for its signing was 18 December.
However, one day before foreign minister V€ayrynen was to set off to Moscow, the Finnish
ambassador sent news that Yeltsin had forbidden the Soviet foreign minister Eduard She-
vardnadze to sign. Ambassador Talvitie had had talks at both the Russian and Soviet MID,
and he ended up delivering information on the Russian stance to the Soviet MID, which
was that Finland should not sign anything with the USSR. As the director of the European
department, Kabanov stated, the Russian view was that the FCMA would be replaced by
the new Russian-Finnish agreement. Kabanov also expressed Russian foreign minister
Andrei Kozyrev’s astonishment that Finland even considered signing the agreement with
the USSR, which was ‘about to cease to exist any day now’. The Soviet MID drew its conclu-
sions from this, and foreign minister Shevarnadzhe told the Finnish ambassador that they
would not sign. Deputy foreign minister Yuri Deryabin asked that the Russian veto would
not be publicised.111
Thus, the FCMA treaty continued to exist and its replacement would be negotiated with
the Soviet successor state, the Russian Federation.112 There was a general understanding
that the latter would nonetheless not become a formal party to the Finnish–Soviet FCMA.
The way out of the FCMA was that, acknowledging that the Soviet Union no longer
existed, Finland would either unilaterally state that the FMCA has lost its validity. This
could be done in a diplomatic note. The other option would have been to give a joint
statement at the signing of the new treaty on the foundations of relations between Fin-
land and the Russian Federation.113 Finland chose the latter.
Finally, on 20 January 1992, during the visit of the Russian deputy prime minister Gen-
nady Burbulis, the FCMA treaty between the Soviet Union and Finland finally expired. At
the same time, the two countries signed their new agreement, the Basic Treaty, which for
its section on security and political relations, contained the same elements that the Soviet
MID had negotiated in the autumn months. After the ceremonies, a phone call was placed
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on Yeltsin to inform him that the ceremony was over. The cordial discussion between Yelt-
sin and Koivisto was held in Russian.114 The next week, Koivisto informed through his chief
of staff that the back-channel with a KGB resident in Helsinki would be discontinued.115
Conclusions
It seems that in the final years of Soviet power, the Gorbachev leadership did not have the
need nor the time to immerse itself in the Finnish–Soviet bilateral relationship. It was pre-
occupied with other problems, both external but to a growing extent, internal, which in
the end proved to be detrimental to the Soviet Union itself. Also, with a new foreign policy
doctrine, which aimed at ending the Cold War and the dissolution of the military blocs, it
did not even want to use the FCMA treaty as a tool to control Finland.
For the Soviet Union, the FCMA played a crucial role in its security considerations until
the major foreign policy doctrine change in late-1980s. Even after the Gorbachev leader-
ship had abandoned the idea of world revolution as a Soviet foreign policy goal, some ele-
ments of the Soviet foreign policy machinery insisted on continuing the old policy line.
Namely, Finland specialists in the CPSU central committee and the Soviet MID fought to
keep the FCMA intact as long as possible; and after it was clear that a new agreement
would replace it, their positions in those talks in October and November 1991 were tough.
Therefore, the view expressed in the literature on the demise of the Soviet Union that its
sphere of influence dissolved at the same time as the Cold War ended, is simplistic. More-
over, as the case of Finland shows, the Russian Federation in fact inherited some aspects
of the Soviet security structure.
An important milestone in the Soviet–Finnish bilateral relationship was the joint decla-
ration of Gorbachev’s state visit to Finland in October 1989, in which the Soviet leadership
acknowledged Finland’s neutrality without restrictions. The bilateral relationship was at
that moment, just before the walls came tumbling down, in a good position for the Finns.
The process that took off in Eastern Europe just weeks later changed also Finland’s posi-
tion in international politics. The end of the Cold War did not result in dismantling all bloc
structures – which had been Gorbachev’s dream – but just the eastern ones. It also
reduced the significance of neutrality, which meant that the situation reached in the
Soviet–Finnish relationship in October 1989 during Gorbachev’s state visit, was soon out-
dated. It furthermore made the Finnish unique position in the Cold War, Finlandisation as
it has been labelled, redundant as a model, which the Soviet Union could promote to the
countries of Eastern Europe as an alternative to integrating into the west.
Finland’s ability to negotiate itself away from the Soviet orbit was enabled by the dilu-
tion of Soviet power rather than Finland’s own resolution. Finland exited the Finnish–
Soviet friendship pact later than the People’s Democracies in Eastern Europe, which left
the Soviet-led bloc after the revolutions of 1989. Paradoxically, even though Finland did
not want to be included into this reference group, it was the only possible option in the
process of annulling the FCMA treaty: As a prelude to Operation PAX, the Finnish foreign
ministry examined how countries with similar references to Germany as an aggressor in
their friendship agreements were interpreting this clause. The only comparisons the minis-
try had were the countries of Eastern Europe. It found out that even the Soviet allies no
longer considered Germany as a threat. The ministry used this to justify its decision to
include a reinterpretation of the FCMA into PAX as well. In this light, the demonstration of
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Rene Nyberg in February 1990, when the operation was just about to be launched, seems
to have a lot more to do with identity politics than realpolitik:
Why should Finland seek company where it doesn’t belong? Why should it join the Eastern
European and Baltic states that now are striving to open the negotiations of the 1940s in Mos-
cow? Finland is content with its position and content with its relations with the Soviet
Union.116
Therefore, through the FCMA treaty Finland was tied to Soviet security considerations,
and thus there was a link to the position of the Eastern Europeans – just as there had
been since the first post-war years. It would be interesting to analyse further first, how
much the Eastern European regimes’ transition away from Moscow, and then later the Bal-
tic States’ independence movements helped Finnish policy-makers to interpret the dilu-
tion of Soviet power. This is not easy to analyse, however, because Finnish Soviet policy is
depicted in both prior literature as well as the policy documents analysed for this study as
a bilateral matter, which thus prudently demarcates Finland’s distinction from Eastern
Europe – both politically and mentally. In the case analysed here, the materials remain
silent on any influence that the Eastern European regimes’ transition away from Moscow
might have had on Finnish decision-makers.
For Finland, discarding the FCMA treaty meant it had regained full sovereignty. In the
autumn of 1991, at the same time that Finland initiated negotiations to terminate the
FCMA, it voiced its interest in joining the European Community. And just two months after
the annulment of the FCMA, in March 1992, it filed for EC membership. Ridding itself of
the post-war restrictions to its sovereignty, Finland entered the post-Cold War world with
a new interpretation of its neutrality, leading to EU membership in 1995. Yet, a valued
part of the country’s self-image is still military non-alliance, which has left Finland outside
NATO.117
A crucial element in Finland’s self-image during the Cold War was its status as a neutral,
Nordic and western country.118 This meant that it needed to actively hide the fact that it
had a military agreement with the Soviet Union. This makes it difficult to study Finland as
part of Soviet security considerations. The study of the Soviet security system has its own
challenges as well. Its security system consisted of multilateral and bilateral agreements,
as well as informal institutions such as the Brezhnev Doctrine, which were not included in
the formal structure of the Soviet neighbourhood policy. This kind of study requires multi-
archival research in several countries of the former Warsaw Pact, as well as other neigh-
bours of the Soviet Union such as Finland. This case study on Finland’s position in the
collapsing Soviet security structure opens important questions for future research, such as
that of the way Soviet power was transferred to the Russian Federation, and the interplay
of the formal and informal institutions, or the roles of different parts of Moscow’s foreign
policy apparatus.
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